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1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABDUCTION AND DEDUCTION
Professor Wagemans claims that:
Abduction is a type of reasoning in which the presence of a certain cause is inferred
from the presence of its effects. The type of reasoning is conventionally valid in
various institutionalized contexts, for example the practice of medical diagnosis and
that of scientific explanation, but logically invalid because it affirms the consequent.

This definition combines two perspectives on abduction: 1) a method for producing
and comparing explanatory hypotheses of observations and 2) a deductively invalid
form of reason with many applications, including but not limited to explaining
observations.
Although abduction in the first sense, as a method for producing and
comparing explanations of hypotheses, is typically formalized using deductively
invalid inference patterns, it is surely possible to formulate this kind of reasoning in
a sound way, for example using the following scheme:
Minor.
Major.
Conclusion.

E has been observed.
H causes E.
H explains E.

The conclusion here means only that H would be an explanation of E, not
necessarily the best. Thus this scheme models what Wagemans calls the
"generative" kind of abduction.
This scheme is intended to be strict, not defeasible. The only way to attack
arguments using this scheme is to show that one or both of the premises are false.
An alternative to formulating the scheme as an inference rule would be to
represent it as a formula in a first-order theory:
∀ E H . E has been observed ∧ H causes E ⇒ H explains E
Either way, the trick here of course is to conclude only that H is a possible
explanation of E, rather than that H is the best explanation, let alone true. This weak
claim can be strict. It need not be retractable with further information, especially
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when used in combination with some method for comparing explanations to find
the best ones.
This scheme for abduction is close to Pierce's formulation, cited in
Wagemans' paper:
The surprising fact, E, is observed; But if H were true, E would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true.

The schema variables have been renamed to coincide with my version. Notice that
neither version of the scheme concludes with H being the best explanation or true.
Here's a reconstruction of Pierce's bean example using this deductive version
of abduction:
Minor.
Major.
Conclusion.

White beans on the floor have been observed.
The beans fell out of this bag of white beans causes
white beans on the floor have been observed.
The beans fell out of this bag of white beans explains
white beans on the floor have been observed.

We have illustrated how abduction in the sense of a method for generating
hypotheses for observations can be formulated as deductive valid inference. Let us
now give an example of an entirely formal model of abduction that is not limited in
its applicability to explaining observations.
Perhaps one of the most influential formalizations of abduction in the field of
Artificial Intelligence is David Poole's Theorist system (Poole, 1988), which was
developed not to model the process of explaining observations but rather as a
framework for nonmonotonic reasoning. Poole's thesis was that nonmonotonic
reasoning does not require a different logic, but just a different way to use classical
logic: "if one allows hypothetical reasoning then there is no need to define a new
logic to handle nonmonotonic reasoning."
Poole defined abduction as follows. Let F be a set of closed formulas of firstorder logic, representing the "facts" of a situation, and Δ be a set of "possible
hypotheses". Abduction is defined as the process of deriving the maximal subsets D
of instantiations of Δ such that F ∪ D is consistent in classical logic. The deductive
closure of such a F ∪ Δ is called an extension of (F, Δ). There can be no extension as
well as multiple extensions.
Poole reconstructed the standard Tweety example of the nonmonotonic logic
community using this framework as follows:
Δ = {bird(x) ⇒ flies(x)}
F = { ∀ x . emu(x) ⇒ bird(x),
∀ x . emu(x) ⇒ ¬flies(x),
emu(Polly),
bird(Tweety) }
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bird(Tweety) is in an extension of (F,Δ), but not flies(Polly), because
including bird(Polly) ⇒ flies(Polly) in D would allow both flies(Polly) and
¬flies(Polly) to be derivable, causing an inconsistency.
Notice that the Tweety example is not an example of generating a hypothesis
to explain an observation. Tweety has been observed, we can presume, to be a bird,
but the flies (Tweety) is not derived to explain this observation, but rather as a
defeasible consequence of being a bird. Poole's choice of this example makes clear
that his model of abduction is not intended to be used only to generate explanations
of observations. His model can however also be used for this purpose.
2. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN ABDUCTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING
Professor Wagemans notes that
Pierce in a later work describes abduction as a key operation in the process of
generating a hypothesis that functions as an explanation of certain facts.

and then goes on to describe a process model for finding the best explanations of
observations, consisting of these three steps:
1. Gather hypotheses (explanations).
2. Rate the quality of the explanations.
3. Choose one of the best explanations.
Here I would only like to point out the apparent similarity between this
procedural conception of abduction and practical reasoning. Starting with a goal,
rather than an observation, a procedure for practical reasoning might look like this:
1. Gather, for example via brainstorming, alternative possible course of
action for realizing the goal.
2. Rate the quality of the alternative courses of action.
3. Choose one of the best courses of action.
My question is: Is this similarity more then superficial? Might abduction and
practical reasoning be specializations of a more general form of reasoning?
3. ON THE DEFEASIBILITY OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES
Professor Wagemanns writes:
Argumentation theorists widely use the term ‘argument(ation) scheme’ in order to
describe various types of defeasible arguments.

Some people, including Henry Prakken and myself, view argumentation schemes as
a generalization of (deductive) inference rules. From this perspective,
argumentation schemes are typically defeasible, but not necessarily so. All of the
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strict inference rules of a natural deduction calculus for classical logic, for example,
may also be viewed as argumentation schemes.
4. ON THE TYPES OF CONCLUSIONS OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF INFERENCE
Professor Wagemans points out the common view that one difference between
abduction and induction concerns the types of their conclusions:
Other scholars emphasize the difference between abduction and induction. They
note that these types of reasoning produce a different type of conclusion, since in
the case of induction the conclusion is of a general nature, whereas in the case of
abduction the conclusion is of a particular nature.

Here I would only like to draw attention to criticisms of this view. For example
Walton, in his "Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation" (Walton, 2006, p. 67)
writes:
There is a common misconception that deductive argumentation is general to the
specific, while inductive reasoning always goes from the specific to the general.

Walton claims the following is a counterexample, of induction with a specific
conclusion:
Premise.
Premise.
Conclusion.

Most students who graduated from Bohemond College
after 1995 took a course on critical thinking.
Elaine was a student who graduated from Bohemond
College after 1995.
Elaine took a course on critical thinking.

The abductive conclusion of Poole's Tweety example, presented earlier in
this comment, is the instantiation
bird(Tweety) ⇒ flies(Tweety)
of the hypothesis
bird(x) ⇒ flies(x)
in the set of hypotheses Δ.
It is unclear to me how this conclusion would be viewed by those who
consider conclusions of abduction to be "of a particular nature". Would this formula
be viewed as "particular", because it is ground, or "general", because it is a material
implication?
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5. DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF ARGUMENT
Not being as familiar as I probably should be with the pragma-dialectic conception
of argument, I needed to read the paper a couple of times to understanding
statements such as the following:
Abduction defined as ‘inference to the best explanation’ involves a standpoint that
can be formulated as “Hi is the best explanation of E” and an argument that can be
formulated as “Of candidate explanations H1, …, Hn of E, Hi meets criteria C1, …, Cn
best”.

It was not immediately clear to me how the proposition “Of candidate
explanations H1, …, Hn of E, Hi meets criteria C1, …, Cn best” can be understood to
be an argument. In the field of computational models of argument, several
conceptions of arguments are common:
 Argument as a single (defeasible) inference step, i.e. a pair consisting
of a set of premises and a conclusion, where the premises and
conclusion are propositions. Such arguments may (but need not be)
instantiations of argumentation schemes of the kind Doug Walton has
been developing (Walton 1996; Walton et al. 2008). Besnard and
Hunter adopt a similar view of the structure of argument in their
deductive conception of argument (Besnard and Hunter 2008), except
that they require the conclusion of an argument to be a deductive
consequence, in classical logic, of the premises of the argument.
 Argument as a (defeasible) proof, i.e. a chain or tree of inference steps.
These are the kinds of arguments that are visualized using
Beardsley/Freeman argument diagrams, for example in Walton's
textbook "Fundamentals of Argument" (Walton 2006). This is also the
conception of argument used by Henry Prakken in his ASPIC+ model
of structured argument (Prakken 2010).
It seems to me that pragma-dialectics adopts yet another conception of
argument, to mean a kind of minor premise of an inference step. Let's take another
look at Wagemann's pattern of argumentation based on abduction in Section 4 of his
paper:
1 It may be hypothesized that X1
1.1 It is observed that Y
1.1’ Of possible explanations X1 – Xn, X1 is the best explanation of Y
1.1’.1 X1 meets criteria C1 – Cn with scores S1 – Sn
1.1’.1’ Decision rule R applies
If I understand correctly, when this pattern is applied, the resulting argument
is an instantiation of "It is observed that Y" and the conclusion of the argument is an
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instantiation of "It may be hypothesized that X1". This pattern could be
reconstructed as a Walton-style argumentation scheme as follows:
Minor.
Major.
Conclusion.

It is observed that Y
Of possible explanations X1 – Xn, X1 is the best
explanation of Y.
It may be hypothesized that X1.

If I understand correctly, in pragma-dialectics the major premise (in this
reconstruction) is called the "justificatory force" of the argument. The reasons for
preferring this terminology in pragma-dialectics are not clear to me, but I suspect
they are based on the observation that in natural language arguments typically only
the minor premise is explicitly stated. The major premise is often left implicit,
because is it assumed to be common knowledge already accepted by the audience.
That is, the argument is an enthymeme. For example, the classical example of a
syllogism would be expressed enthymematically as "Socrates is mortal since he is
human", not as "Socrates is mortal because all men are mortal".
The remainder of the pattern can be handled by a second argumentation
scheme:
Premise 1.
Premise 2.
Conclusion.

X1, an explanation of Y, meets criteria C1 – Cn with
scores S1 – Sn
Decision rule R applies.
Of possible explanations X1 – Xn of Y, X1 is the best
explanation of Y.

Notice that I've modified the first premise slightly in this reconstruction, to
include a reference to Y, the observation to be explained. Otherwise, the premises
would seem under constrained. The conclusion is about explanations of Y, not
explanations of anything.
One thing about these schemes that seems somewhat inadequate as an
account of abduction in the sense of a method for finding the best explanation of an
observation, inherited from Wagemans' original formulation, is that alternative
explanations are not explicitly compared with X1. The other explanations, X2 to Xn,
are referenced, but the comparison of their scores with the scores of X1 are buried
in the decision rule, R, and not transparent. Here I think there may be some room for
improvement.
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